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Abstract
The main motivation of this paper is to describe an architecture that intends to ease the veriﬁcation of
distributed algorithms and protocols (possibly mobile) through model checking. The core of the architecture
is the protocol speciﬁcation language (LEP), which has constructions, called pronouns, that allows for high-
level speciﬁcation. This means a much less verbose speciﬁcation, when compared with the general-purpose
speciﬁcation language of the model checker used in our experiments. Through a two-step process, LEP
speciﬁcations are translated into the language of a model checker and the result is translated back to LEP.
A formal communication model is used in the translation process in order to allow the use of diﬀerent model
checkers. Currently the prototype of the architecture uses the model checkers Spin and SMV.
Keywords: Protocol Speciﬁcation, Formal Veriﬁcation, Model Checking.
1 Introduction
Nowadays the task of validating a system is getting harder due to the huge com-
plexity, which is inherent to most of the current systems. These diﬃculties are
even bigger when the systems are distributed or have mobile elements. For those
systems, techniques and automated tools that support validation, like simulation,
equivalence checking, theorem proving and model checking are even more crucial.
The application of above mentioned tools and techniques in the development and
validation of systems is called Formal Analysis of the systems. This article focuses
on the Formal Analysis of distributed algorithms and protocols. In the sequel we
discuss, on a epistemological basis, the essential use of Formal Methods (mainly
Model Checking MC ) as the main extension of software testing.
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Language oriented software development (LOSD) is a formal technique for the
development of software systems based on the application of tools built from the
(formal) semantics of a language designed to be strong enough to describe the spe-
ciﬁc domain associated with it. Successful and representative examples of LOSD
cases are Database systems and Compiler Construction . The former is based on
Relational Calculus and SQL variants while the latter is based on formal semantics
like SOS, Action Semantics and Denotational Semantics, besides Grammars for the
parsers construction. By providing an adequate language and its formal semantics
one can automatically develop a debugger or even a visual environment for a pro-
gramming language. During the 70’s and 80’s compiler compilers and DBML’s were
strongly developed.
One of the main advantages advocated by the formal methods community is the
correctness of the software developed in this way. The general argument is that from
a (correct) speciﬁcation one derives (automatically) correct running code. We will
not follow this line of argumentation. Instead, we argue that the main advantage of
using formal methods is that, in general, they are based on a language or languages
with precise semantics and most of the times this semantics is well-suited to the
speciﬁc domain.
We adopt the analogy between the development of scientiﬁc theories and soft-
ware systems which is nicely approached by Haeberer and Maibaum (the reader can
read [12] as an example of a quite useful view for software engineers). According
the main thoughts in Epistemology and Theory of Science, the validation of a sci-
entiﬁc theory is unfeasible. Following Popper [17], Science evolves by means of the
conjectures and refutations cycle. This cycle’s necessary existence follows from the
falsiﬁability principle that is inherent to Scientiﬁc Theories. Concerning its struc-
ture, a scientiﬁc theory is formed by theoretical and empirical terms, built from,
respectively, theoretical and empirical languages that forms the linguistic appara-
tus of the theory. Carnap [4] has a linguistic analysis of Scientiﬁc Theories that is
extremely useful when taking the analogy between Scientiﬁc Theory development
and Software Systems development. Roughly speaking, his analysis concludes that
while the Theoretical Laws of a theory, stated in terms of the theoretical language,
are essentially universals, the Observable Experiments are essentially existentials.
So to say, the testing of a Theoretical Law by means of experimentation cannot
”entails that the hypothesis is true on the basis of the Laws of the Theory”. The
honest statement is ”the experiment did not refute the hypothesis made on the basis
of the Laws of the Theory”. Formally speaking, Carnap advocates that the anal-
ysis of a Scientiﬁc Theory is performed in a context with the Laws of the Theory,
expressed by the Theoretical Language, a Hypothesis which is formulated with the
help of the Empirical (Observable) Language of the Theory, and, with a background
theory, that supports the evaluation of the Hypothesis. Carnap’s analysis, together
with Popper’s view of Science, supports the dictum that is feasible to perform the
analysis of a theory, aiming its utility, not its truth.
From the above discussed and already established analogy between Theory of
Science and Software Development, we advocate that the process of software de-
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velopment should be based on Carnap’s linguistic framework aiming to reach the
utility of the systems. The correctness of a software is unreachable, according the
above analysis. From a naive point of view, unless a formal speciﬁcation is evidently
truth regarding the background theory of the world, there is no way to, ontolog-
ically, support the truth of universals (the laws of a particular software) on an
existential basis (the possible experiments). The task of formally theorem proving
cannot be argue as a way of escaping from this situation, since, the very statements
to be proved about the systems are not the whole systems set of properties, that,
according Leibniz principle identiﬁes it.
Aiming to provide a platform to perform the (Formal) Analysis of Software Sys-
tems that is able to develop useful software, we propose, following the Carnapian
linguistic view of science, the Language Oriented Software Development. In fact this
approach cannot be stated as a novelty by its own, since it has been applied, before
us, in many well-established domains. The main purpose of this article is to show a
case study, a language based architecture for distributed algorithms and protocols
Speciﬁcation and Formal Analysis. Our main contribution is a clear statement of
this issue and the application of a uniform language to provide semantics for the the-
oretical as well the empirical terms of the speciﬁcation. Uniformness is assured by
providing smaller semantical gaps between the empirical and the theoretical (sub)
languages. This task is particularly interesting with regard to our case study, since
the linguistic concept of pronoun will be mapped to universals, from the distributed
algorithm/protocol point of view, as well to existential, from a particular network-
topology point of view. Other universals, as the time evolving, will be described
theoretically as properties (Universals) and empirically as counter-examples. This
last case is not diﬀerent from the formal methods community; however, our archi-
tecture will provide an uniform correspondence between speciﬁcations universals
concepts and the very counter-examples supporting theirs falsiﬁability. A map-
ping from traces (counter-examples), provided by a model-checker or some other
formal tool, to the very universal linguistic concept representing the time evolving
in the property that produced the trace, induced by the rest of the speciﬁcation,
is provided by the architecture. There is plethora of formal techniques and lan-
guages that help SEs to perform (Formal) Analysis. Among the mentioned Formal
Analysis techniques, MC is an automatic formal method that validates models by
exhaustively exploring their computational trees. Those models are ﬁnite transition
systems and are strongly related to Kripke models. Thus, the properties to be val-
idated are usually expressed using temporal logics. A model checker then typically
veriﬁes whether or not a given set of properties holds over a model of the system.
It has a complementary role when compared to Theorem Proving. The later aims
to establish that a certain property is a logical consequence of the speciﬁcation
of the system/protocol/distributed algorithm. Of course, when such property is
not a logical/deductive consequence of the speciﬁcation the Theorem Prover is of
no help at all. We advocate that MC is a better tool for Formal Analysis than
Theorem Provers, being the later excellent tools for providing certiﬁcates of func-
tionality, usually produced after the Formal Analysis phase. Of course one can use
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TPs in order to carry out Formal Analysis, however, the task of reﬁnement of the
speciﬁcation provided by error-ﬁnding is harder by means of TPs.
Our language based architecture intends to ease the speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation
of distributed algorithms and protocols, possibly mobile, through model checking.
The core of the architecture is the protocol speciﬁcation language (LEP), which
has constructions, called pronouns, that allows for high-level speciﬁcation. This
means a much less verbose speciﬁcation, when compared with the general-purpose
speciﬁcation language of the model checker used in our experiments. Through a two-
step process, LEP speciﬁcations are translated into the language of a model checker
and the result is translated back to LEP. An intermediate speciﬁcation, at the level
of the communication model, is used in the translation process in order to allow
the use of diﬀerent model checkers. Currently, the prototype of the architecture,
in development, has the model checkers Spin [10] and SMV [6] as alternative back-
ends. The communication model, formally speciﬁed in operational semantics, aims
to be general enough to be able to represent any protocol, mobile or not. It is
based on a (dynamically) conﬁgurable connection graph that represents the relative
localization of each functional element of the protocol regarded to the whole net.
Each element has an internal behaviour, regulated by a transition system, and,
queues to manage any form of communication among the network’s elements. This
will be better explained in the respective section of the article.
Among the experiments performed with the prototype, DSR (Dynamic Source
Routing - a protocol for ad-hoc networks) [11] is presented here. Some aspects such
as the size and complexity of the speciﬁcations found in the manual speciﬁcation of
this protocol, motivated us to propose the architecture.
The analysis of the experiments performed with the architecture shows, in an
evident way, that the use of pronouns as a bridge between the universals of the
theoretical language, in the Carnapian sense, and the existentials of the empirical
language is a strong linguistic component in achieving a useful platform for dis-
tributed algorithms and protocols analysis. It is worth mentioning that the use of
Net-Grammar [7] together with ﬁltrations of modal temporal-logic to improve the
search-space exploration, in terms of time, proceeding the analysis of the (temporal)
properties in a theoretically suitable way. So to say, the veriﬁcation of a property
of a large class of instances of a network-topology is performed in a sound and
complete way on a ﬁnite set of instances. For reasons of lack of space, this is not
detailed in this article, however, it is mentioned with the purpose of pointing out
an uniformity issue concerning the case study.
The architecture does not intend to solve the so-called “state explosion” problem
of veriﬁcation of systems by means of the model checking technique. The problem
is a hard one. Apart from the fact that the decidability problem for the usual
temporal propositional logics used in MC, namely CTL, LTL and μ-Calculus, are
known to be hard, from PSPACE-complete to EXPTime-Complete, the existence
of exponential-size speciﬁcations (compared to the size of the valid properties) is
strongly connected with the CoNP complexity class, by means of a mapping from
classical propositional proofs into temporal properties over transition systems, as
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well as strongly related to Sat solvers (NP complexity class). Thus, feasibility of
general schemas for compositional validation of systems seems to be as hard as to
solve the main conjectures about the classes NP, CoNP and PSPace. Of course, it
seems that, from the intractability of the temporal logics one could conclude that
it is probably an unfeasible task, since the class EXPTime is independent of the
main conjectures already mentioned. Thus, our architecture aims a better using of
MC technique in a broader way, by allowing several tools at the backend, which is
of course a feasible task.
2 Proposed Architecture
This architecture can be seen as an additional layer on the top of the usual model
checking process. It is supposed to simplify the veriﬁcation process since its domain-
speciﬁc language becomes transparent to the user the details of the chosen model
checker’s speciﬁcation language.
2.1 General description
Figure 1 depicts the proposed architecture. The top layer consists of LEP (protocol
description plus properties to be checked) and the model checker’s results at the
level of the original LEP speciﬁcation of the protocol. The bottom layer contains
the traditional model checking process. The input of this layer is the output of
the intermediate layer, where code translations are made in order to transform the
speciﬁcation provided in LEP into the speciﬁcation accepted by the model checker.
These translations to the language of the model checker are made by the modules
that are speciﬁc to the chosen model checker (CI2SMV and CI2Spin in ﬁgure 1).
The intermediate layer also translates the model checker’s result back to the level of
LEP. This intermediate layer is important since diﬀerent model checking tools may
be used interchangeably. In out prototype all translator modules were implemented
using the TXL transformation language [8], whose description is not on the scope
of this text. However, the formal semantic of the translations presented in sections
2.4 and 2.5 deﬁnes how it works.
2.2 LEP
LEP is a process-based language such as CCS [14] for the speciﬁcation of mobile
protocols and distributed algorithms. It combines the concepts of guarded com-
mands from CCS, overload of names from Pi-calculus [15] and pronouns (adapted
from OO concerns [9]). Pronouns can be seen as a general means of referencing a
set of elements, making the speciﬁcation shorter, more legible and precise. For ex-
ample, in a ordinary speciﬁcation language, if we want to send a message to several
processes, we have to iterate through the set of elements. Using LEP, we simply
write: everyone!msg
Pronoun everyone also works with partially connected networks, and where
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Fig. 1. Architecture’s Description
broadcast communication happens through the ﬂooding 4 of messages. If this pro-
noun is used for receiving a message (everyone?x ), it behaves like a synchronization
point that will receive the message x from every element of the network. Since we
may have disconnections, processes that execute this command may wait indeﬁ-
nitely. In order to alleviate it we can use the pronoun any(k) in the receive clause
that waits for messages from k hops.
In LEP, pronouns may appear in any place where an element’s identiﬁer can
appear. We consider the following pronouns: this: a reference to the same module
instance where it occurs; when used as right-side value, regards an internal (not
visible to the user) value that identiﬁes this element; sender: in an action clause of
a receive command, this pronoun regards the element who sent the message; this is
useful in a request-reply communication style; any(t, k): this is a parametric and
generic pronoun that refers to any k elements of the system of type t (excluding the
element where it occurs); this pronoun adds non-determinism to the speciﬁcation;
anyother(t, x, k): this is a parametric and generic pronoun that returns any k
elements of type t in a network that diﬀer from the given argument x ; everyone(t):
in the sending, it regards to every element of type t that can be reached from the
element where it occurs; it can be used in broadcast and the corresponding reply
messages. In the receiving of a message, it waits for messages of every element in the
network; neighbours(t, k): refers to the set of elements of type t that are reachable
in k steps (paths from this node to the target have a maximum of k nodes); parent:
regards the creator of the element where the pronoun occurs; children: regards all
of the elements created by the element where the pronoun occurs. The parameter k
when omitted has a default value equals to 1. The parameter t is also optional and
deﬁne the types of elements (module’s identiﬁers) regarded by the pronoun. When
omitted, t has the type of the current module.
Regarding the topology, we extend the concept of graph grammars [7] by adding
4 A message is sent through ﬂooding when the hosts who receive it, pass to their neighbourhood in order
to reach the whole network.
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attributes that are used to deﬁne pronouns. The grammar deﬁnes the topology
adopted by a speciﬁcation and the strings generated by the grammar are instances
of the topology in the initial state of the validation. Pronouns are initialised through
synthesized and inherited attributes, which are calculated during the generation of a
network i.e., the application of the production rules of an attribute graph grammar.
Inserting new attributes into an attribute graph grammar is a way of creating user-
deﬁned pronouns.
In table 1 we show a way of specifying a ring topology using attribute graph
grammars. Here we deﬁne the pronoun neighbours through the use of the attributes
s-neigh and h-neigh for synthesized and inherited attributes, respectively. At the
end of the process the pronoun neighbours is given by the attribute s-neigh for each
generated node. At this speciﬁcation: S and S’ are non-terminals; t is a terminal;
⇒ connects a non-terminal with its right-side; in and out determines input and
output nodes of a graph grammar in a rule; assignments between { and } regards
attributes while elements and oriented arrows (←,→,↔) outside regards the graph
grammar.
S ⇒ t { t.s-neigh ← S’.s-neigh } ↔ S’ { S’.h-neigh ← t }
S’1 { S’1.s-neigh ← t } ⇒ in(t) { t.s-neigh ← S’2.s-neigh } →
out(S’2) { S’2.h-neigh ← S’1.h-neigh }
S’ { S’.s-neigh ← t } ⇒ in(out(t)) { t.s-neigh ← S’.h-neigh }
Table 1
Production rules for a ring using attribute graph grammars
In the architecture we provide pre-deﬁned grammars for rings, stars, trees, se-
quences, arbitraries and complete graphs (networks). Moreover, we can specify
the initial network explicitly. In order to exemplify a speciﬁcation in LEP, ﬁgure 2
shows how a Leader Election algorithm could be speciﬁed in an arbitrary topology.
In bold we have the reserved words of LEP and in italic we have the pronouns. A
speciﬁcation unit of LEP has a topology declaration that deﬁnes the initial struc-
ture of the network, and the declaration of the modules. The topology can be a
pre-deﬁned one or can be given by the user. In the ﬁgure 2, node labelled 1 has
the neighbourhood (nodes directly connected) 2 and 3, node 2 has 1, 3 and 4, and
so on. About the topology’s parameters, we can have: (un)reliable, (un)directed,
(un)secure, static or dynamic. A topology is reliable when links and nodes do not
fail i.e., messages are not lost in the system. Secure means that messages are not
corrupted. Directed means that links in the network are bi-directional. When a
topology is dynamic, the movements of hosts are made automatically and transpar-
ent to the user. It is useful when modelling ad hoc networks, since normally mobile
hosts move without notice. Reliable, directed, secure and static are the default
values of the topology’s parameters.
The module candidate deﬁnes the state-machine of the nodes. init and stop
marks are the commands that will be executed in the initial and the ﬁnal states of
the module, respectively. Operator ”->” deﬁnes a transition with the pre-condition
before the operator and the action after it. Except init transition, which is executed
once, in the beginning, the execution of a process is a looping on the module’s
transitions. The word true can also be a pre-condition, which says that its action can
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topology is {1 - {2,3}, 2 - {1,3,4}, 3 - {1,2,4}, 4 - {2,3}} reliable;
module candidate
vars my, p, count : int;
init -> count = 0; my =  this; neighbours!msg(my, count);
this?win -> stop;
this?msg(p, count) ->
if ((p > my) or ((p == my) and (count < topology.size))) then
my = p;  count = count + 1;
neighbours!msg(my, count);
else
if ((p == this) and (count > topology.size)) then
everyone!win; stop;
endif
endif
endmodule
Fig. 2. Leader Election in a arbitrary network speciﬁed in LEP
be executed whenever possible (non-deterministically). Synchronization of processes
are done through the operators send ”!” and receive ”?”. If we replace the explicit
deﬁnition of the topology in the ﬁgure 2 by ”topology is ring(<6) direct reliable”, the
speciﬁcation still works. It allows the reuse of speciﬁcations for distinct topologies,
which shows a interesting feature of LEP.
We also use pronouns in the speciﬁcation of model’s properties. Moreover, when
a identiﬁer that occurs in a formulae is not a pre-deﬁned pronoun, it uniﬁes over
the occurrences of the variables. In addition, send and receive commands can also
be used as the subformulae: [](p!alive(everyone)→ <>p?ack(any(k))). However,
the interpretation of pronouns can change a little while used in a property. The
property above expressed in LTL (Linear Time Logic) asks whether always exists a
state where a process p sends a message alive to every other process and eventually
receives at least k messages ack. We consider the following pronouns for specifying
properties seen as commands of sending or receiving messages: everyone: speci-
ﬁes whether there is some state where a process sends or receives a message from
every other process in the network; in the sending, everyone means every reachable
process; in the receiving, it means every process of the network; none: speciﬁes
that there are no states where a process that sends or receives a given message;
p!msg(none) is semantically equivalent to not p!msg ; any(k): the meaning is the
same as everyone to a k -size subset of the processes.
2.3 Communication Model of LEP
In this section we present a formal description of a computation model for dis-
tributed algorithms, that is the basis of LEP’s execution. In fact, in this part we
describe the formal semantics of LEP by means of a translation from LEP into its
communication model. For the sake of a brief and meaningful description, we focus
on a essential fragment of LEP.
In order to specify the computation model of LEP in SOS [16] we use a structure
that we call environment (ﬁgure 3). Its structure is a graph where nodes vi represent
processes and edges aij deﬁnes the available connections among processes. Each
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node is associated to a logical element that contains two buﬀers bin and bout for
input and output exchange of messages, respectively. Channels interconnect these
elements in pairs.
v1
v3v2 a23
a 12
a
13
env
e1
binbout
Fig. 3. Environment of the Computation Model of LEP
When sending a message, the sender process puts the message in its output
buﬀer in order to be passed to the input buﬀer of the receiver process. Buﬀers’
size and the way of storing messages indicate how the system behaves. Buﬀer’s
size equals to zero implies rendezvous communication. Messages are stored in the
buﬀers, which may behave as a queue, stack or even a simple set.
Besides external communication among processes, each process has internal tran-
sitions that may change its state. The state of a process is composed by a set of
local variables and two buﬀers for storing input and output messages. These states
are important in the speciﬁcation of properties about the system. We consider the
following syntactic categories: e ∈ Elem = {Id×Buf ×Buf × Loc× Trans}, v ∈
V rt = Set of vertexes, a ∈ Edge = {V rt × V rt}, gr ∈ Grf = V rt ∪ Edge, ch ∈
Chan = Set of channels, env ∈ Env = Environment.
The abstract syntax of the computation model of LEP is the following:
v : V rt
v : Grf
v1 : V rt v2 : V rt a : Edge
v1
a
→ v2 : Grf
gr1 : Grf gr2 : Grf
gr1 gr2 : Grf
gr : Grf f : V rt(gr) → Elem g : Chan → Edge
< gr, f, g >: Env
The semantic rules of the computation model of LEP may be described as fol-
lowing:
(1)
< ida, bin, bout, α, t >→< ida′, bin′, bout′, α′, t′ >
< gr, f, g >→< gr, f ′, g >
(2) < id, bin, bout, α, ch!m(val)|t >→< id, bin, bout.ch!m(val), α, t >
< id, ch?m(val)|bin , bout, α, t[x] >→< id, bin, bout, α, t[m(val)/x] >
(3)
< ida, bin, ch!m(val)|bout, α1, t >→< ida′, bin, bout, α1, t >
< idb, ch?x|bin2 , bout2 , α2, t2 >→< idb′, ch?m(val)|bin2 , bout2 , α2, t2 >
< gr, f, g >→< gr, f ′, g >
(4)
< id, bin, bout, α, insert(a, v2)|t >→< id, bin, bout, α, t >
< gr, f, g >→< gr′, f, g >
(5)
< id, bin, bout, α, remove(a)|t >→< id, bin, bout, α, t >
< gr, f, g >→< gr′, f, g >
(6)
< id, bin, bout, α, insert(v1)|t >→< id, bin, bout, α, t >
< gr, f, g >→< gr′, f ′, g >
(7)
< id, bin, bout, α, remove(v1)|t >→< id, bin, bout, α, t >
< gr, f, g >→< gr′, f ′, g >
The rules and the respective conditions and contexts are: (1) Evolution of the
system f(v) = A, f ′(v) = A′, {∀v1, v1 
= v, f(v1) = f ′(v1)}; (2) Internal tran-
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sitions v1, v2 ∈ gr, f(v1) = A, f(v2) = B, v1
a
→ v2 ∈ gr, a ∈ g(ch); (3)
Synchronization rule {v1, v2} ⊂ gr, f(v1) =< id, bin, bout, α, insert(a)|t >, v1
a
→
v2 
∈ gr, gr′ = gr ∪ {v1
a
→ v2}; (4) Arrow insertion {v1, v2} ⊂ gr, f(v1) =<
id, bin, bout, α, remove(a)|t >, v1
a
→ v2 ∈ gr, gr′ = gr − {v1
a
→ v2}; (5) Arrow
removal f(v) =< id, bin, bout, α, insert(v1)|t >, v ∈ gr, 
 ∃e, f(v1) = e, v1 
∈
gr, f ′(v1) = e, e ∈ Elem, gr′ = gr ∪ {v1}; (6) Vertex insertion {v, v1} ⊂ gr, v
a
→
v1 ∈ gr, f(v) =< id, bin, bout, α, remove(v1)|t >, f ′(v1) = φ, gr′ = gr − {v
a
→ v1};
(7) Vertex removal;
On these rules, operator ’|’ separates the ﬁrst and the rest of the messages in
a buﬀer, ’.’ concatenates a message with a buﬀer, a t[m(val)/x] is a λ-abstraction
that will evolve the state of the element taking into account that a message m(val)
was received.
2.4 Translation from LEP into its Computation Model
In this section we present a formal description in SOS [16] of how LEP speciﬁcations
are translated through rewriting rules to the speciﬁcation of its computation model.
In the translation, we map the pronouns to their respective elements based on
the topology and context (place where the pronoun appears) given. Exchange of
messages are described only in the intermediate code since it is simpler to specify a
one to one communication than a one to many that can be done by the pronouns.
Due to the lack of space, we present part of the formal description of LEP. The
rest may be described in a similar way. Considering the syntactic categories of the
previous section, we can add the following: mid ∈ MId, t ∈ Trans = CExp × Cmd,
ce ∈ CExp, m ∈ Msg, cm ∈ Cmd, ch ∈ Chan, top ∈ Top, bool ∈ Bool, connec ∈
MId → { MId }.
In the semantic model, top is the topology of the network, st is the state of the
translation, which contains the current module’s identiﬁer plus the topology. Func-
tions f:Pron x MId x Top→{Chan} and g:Chan→ MId x MId provides information
about the topology of the network. Messages in LEP are translated to messages
with two additional arguments that can be seen as messages’ labels: the sender’s
identiﬁer and a boolean value that indicates whether the message must be forwarded
like in pronoun everyone. The semantics rules are the following:
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<topology is connections params; mod prop> 
mod, processTopology(connections,params,mod)
<module mid t endmodule> 
< bin, bout, assoc, t, st(mid, top) >,
onde : |bin| = |bout| = 0, {∀v assoc(v) = 0}
< tlep1 tlep2 , st(mid, top) > 
tlep1 , st(mid, top)tlep2 , st(mid, top)
< celep → cmlep, st(mid, top) > 
celep, st(mid, top) ->
generateConditionEveryone(celep , mid, top)
cmlep, st(mid, top)
< cmlep1 ; cmlep2 , st(mid, top) > 
cmlep1 , st(mid, top) ; cmlep2 , st(mid, top)
< if ce then cm endif, st(mid, top) > 
if ce, st(mid, top) { cm, st(mid, top) }
< neighbours!m,st(mid, top) > 
local1 = 0;
while (local1 <= k) {
ch[local1]!m(mid, false);
local1 + +; }
, onde : processPronoun(neighbours,mid, top) = {ch[1], ..., ch[k]},
g(ch[1]) = mid1, g(ch[k]) = midk, {mid1, midk} ∪MId,
k = |processPronoun(neighbours,mid, top)|
The conditions on the translation rules are respectively: (1) |bin| =
|bout| = 0, {∀v assoc(v) = 0}; (2)none; (3) none; (4) If the network
is unreliable i.e., nodes may discard message (5) g(ch) = (m,mid),∀m ∈
MId (7) f(neighbours,mid, top) = {ch1, ..., chk}, g(ch1) = (mid, id1), g(chk) =
(mid, idk)id1..k ∈ MId, 1 ≤ k ≤ |f(neighbours,mid, top)|. Function processTopol-
ogy generates topology information in order to be used in the translation, and
function generateConditionEveryone generates commands that tests whether the
arrived message must be forwarded or it was already received, and forwards accord-
ing to these conditions.
2.5 Translation from the Computation Model into Promela
In this section we show how the intermediate code of the architecture is mapped
into the constructions of Promela (Spin’s input language)[10]. The translation is
almost straightforward since pronouns were already treated in the translation from
LEP to the intermediate code. Again the description is not complete due to the
lack of space. Considering the syntactic categories of the previous sections, we have
the following rewriting rules:
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<< mid, bin, bout, assoc, t > e2, top, prop > 
declare-channel-msgs(mid, t) declare-vars(prop) declare-runs(mid, top)
< mid, bin, bout, assoc, t >, top, prop
e2, top, prop
<< mid, bin, bout, assoc, t >, top, prop > 
proctype mid {
declare-locals(assoc)
declare-init(t)
do t, top, prop od }
< ce → cm, top, prop > 
:: ce → update-vars(ce, prop)cm, top, prop
< if ce{cm}, top, prop > 
if :: ce → update-vars(ce, prop)cm, top, prop
:: else fi
In these rules, function declare-channel-msgs deﬁnes the channel of messages
and the messages’ type exchanged by the given process, which are necessary in the
communication of processes in Promela; function declare-locals declares the local
variables of the process; declare-init inserts into the speciﬁcation the commands
that must be executed in beginning of the process and function increment-count-
variables increments the global variables that will be used by the properties in Spin.
2.6 Translation from the Communication Model into SMV
Similarly to the section 2.5, we present here the translation of the Communication
Model to SMV [6]. The translation is not so straightforward as the translation to
Promela, since SMV does not have primitives for communication via channels in its
basic implementation.
< e1 e2, top, prop > 
MODULE main
V AR declare-globals(e1, e2, top)
ASSIGN assign-globals(e1, e2, top)
e1, tope2, top
<< mid, bin, bout, assoc, t >, top > 
MODULE mod mid(mid, processes,matrix)
V AR declare-locals(assoc)declare-states(t)
ASSIGN assign-initial-states(t)t, top
FAIRNESS running
<< ce → id = expr >, cm, top, pos > 
next(id) :=
case order = pos & generate-pre-conds(ce, id, top) : expr;
esac;
ce → cm, top, inc(pos)
<< ce1 → if(ce2){cm1} >, cm2, top, pos > 
ce1 & ce2 → cm1, top, pos
ce1 → cm2, top, inc(pos)
In the translation rules, function declare-main declares the instances of the net-
work and passes modules id’s as parameters among the instances in order to perform
the communication; function declare-locals declares the local variables like partner
that stores the identiﬁer of a partner in a message exchange; function declare-states
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declares a variable that stores one of the possible states of the instances based on
the ingoing and outgoing arcs of the related node in the intermediate code; assign-
initial-states assigns the initial state of the variables; and ﬁnally function extract-
state-transitions maps commands of synchronization and assignment to states and
state transitions.
3 Example of Use
In this section we describe informally the behaviour of the protocol DSR. In addition
we describe how we model this protocol, the assumptions and how it was speciﬁed
in LEP. For a not valid property over this model, we show the counter-example
returned by Spin and how it is converted to another one at the abstract level of
LEP.
3.1 Speciﬁcation of DSR
Dynamic Source Routing [11] is a simple and eﬃcient routing protocol for MANETs
(Mobile Ad hoc NETworks). Each package sent across the network carries its route
by adding node’s identiﬁers to its header while it visits them. Each node keeps a
cache of routes, which are learnt by the packages sent via this node. DSR is com-
posed of two sub-protocols: one for ﬁnding out routes and another for maintaining
routes.
When a node wishes to send a package to another node, it searches for a route
to this destiny in its local cache. If this search succeeds, the package is sent to the
ﬁrst node of the route. This is repeated at every node until the package reaches its
destination. If the search fails, the sub-protocol for ﬁnding routes is activated. In
the cases when a routing error occurs, a route error packet is sent and the nodes
which receive it update their cache. This is only the basic version of DSR, and
many other optimizations have been proposed [11].
3.2 Modelling DSR
We specify the protocol DSR based on the following assumptions: (i) We assume
that all nodes wishing to communicate are willing to participate fully in the protocol;
(ii) Nodes do not suﬀer from interference (e.g. a host receives two distinct messages
at the same time, which could cause the loss of the messages); (iii) Nodes within the
ad hoc network may move at any time without notice; (iv) Nodes are distinguishable.
In the ﬁgure 4 we can see part of a manual DSR speciﬁcation in LEP. Due to lack
of space, we do not present the speciﬁcation of the whole protocol. For instance,
we do not include the cache of routes. Instead each mobile host has to recalculate
a route whenever he needs to send a message.
Here we describe some syntactic details of LEP used in the excerpt of the DSR
speciﬁcation (ﬁgure 4) which were not discussed previously. The semantics of this
speciﬁcation is discussed in the next paragraph. Since parameter dynamic is used
in the deﬁnition of the topology, the movements of hosts are implicitly and auto-
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1 topology is Arbitrary(7) undirected dynamic;
2 module hop
3 (seq:hop)#int packet; 
4 int order=0; 
5 true -> packet#1.clean; packet#1.first = this; packet#1.last = anyother(this); 
6 order = { order, order+1 }; packet#2 = order; 
7 neighbours!rr(packet); 
8 this?rr (packet) -> 
9 if this == packet#1.last then 
10 packet#1.add(this); 
11 packet#1.previous!unicast(packet); 
12 else 
13 if not(packet#1.contains(this)) then 
14 packet#1.add(this);
15 neighbours!rr(packet);
16 endif 
17 endif 
18 this?unicast (packet) -> 
19 if this == packet#1.first then 
20 packet#1.next!comm(packet); 
21 else 
22 packet#1.previous!unicast(packet); 
23 endif 
24 this?comm (packet) -> 
25 if this <> packet#1.last then 
26 if neighbours.contains(packet#1.next) then 
27 packet#1.next!comm(packet);
28 else 
29 sender!packet_error(packet);
30 packet.remove(packet.range(this,packet#1.last));
31 endif 
32 endif 
33 this?packet_error (packet) -> 
34 endmodule
Fig. 4. Excerpt of DSR speciﬁcation in LEP
matically generated. The symbol ’#’ used in the local declaration (line 3) is a type
constructor of LEP, which aggregate other types to create a composed one. Beyond
the basic types int and bool, a type can be a sequence of values (seq) or a set of
values set. For each of those collections we have a set of ordinary functions to treat
them. A complete list is presented at [1]. In lines 5-6 a mobile host chooses a
partner for communicating non-deterministically. In the speciﬁcation the symbol
’#’ works as a selector for a composed type. In line 6 the symbols ({ }) deﬁne
a non-deterministic choice. Finally, in line 33 the treatment of the receiving of a
packet-error message is left unspeciﬁed. The other commands work as previously
described (section 2.2).
About the semantics, the reason for using the parameter dynamic in the de-
scription of the topology is that mobile hosts can move at any time and at any
speed without notice. I.e., these movements are independent of the speciﬁcation.
So, we decide not to do it explicitly. The initial behaviour of a mobile host is
non-deterministic since in the DSR protocol a host can send a message whenever
he wants. The variable order is used to identify the request of routes in order to
avoid the duplication of responses because of ﬂooding. Since LEP still does not deal
with real-time issues, we model the retransmissions of DSR, which are caused by
the timeout of a delayed response to a request, through a non-deterministic choice
of the value of the variable order (line 6). If we increment this variable, it means a
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new request. Otherwise, it means a retransmission. The sending commands at lines
7 and 15 mean that a request route message is sent through ﬂooding to the entire
network of reachable nodes. In the line 26 a mobile host, after receiving a packet
to be transmitted, veriﬁes whether it still is connected with the next mobile host
in the packet. If it is not connected, an error message (packet error) is sent to the
sender of this packet. The other transitions work as expected.
About DSR we may have the following properties:
Property Result
<>p!rr(q) and [](q!unicast(none) and q!rr(none)) true
[](p!rr)→<> (p!comm) true
[](none!packet error) false
[](none!unicast(p) U p!comm) false
In the translation to Promela made by the architecture, the dynamic movement
of nodes is simulated through non-deterministic changes to a matrix of connections
among nodes. This is possible since movements reﬂect changes in reachability rather
than physical position. Because of these changes, the property [](none!packet error)
is false. The property ([](none!unicast(p) U p!comm)) is clearly a mistake in the
order of formulae.
Properties about a model in Spin regard global variables in the speciﬁcation.
Then, many variables have to be generated at the translation phase in order to spec-
ify and verify the properties listed above. It highlights a disadvantage of manually
using speciﬁcation languages less abstract as Promela. About counter-examples, the
counter-example of the property [](none!unicast(p) U p!comm) returned by Spin as
a result of verifying the LEP speciﬁcation translated to Promela is presented in the
ﬁgure 5.
Fig. 5. Counter-example of the property [](none!unicast(p) U p!comm) in XSpin
The counter-example that we aim to obtain at the abstract level of LEP for the
property [](none!unicast(p) U p!comm) is the following:
C. Bazilio et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 184 (2007) 189–207 203
some1!unicast(p) ⇒ p!comm
A counter-example returned by the architecture is a sequence of actions a1 ⇒
a2 ⇒ ... ⇒ ak, where each aj is a send/receive command, whose sender/receiver
(actors) must occurs in the property to be veriﬁed, a1 is the starting action of the
counter-example, meaning that no relevant action was taken before it, and ak is the
ending action, meaning that no action could be taken after it. Any identiﬁer other
than the reserved words of the properties (none, everyone, any(k)) is a variable
in the counter example. Moreover, like in the properties, variables with the same
name regard the same actor or message. For instance, in the counter-example some1
(some1 is a generated variable that regards an actor that not occurs in the property)
sends a message unicast to actor p and, after some steps, it sends a message comm,
which is a contradiction to the formula []none!unicast(p)Up!comm.
Although the counter-example presented in ﬁgure 5 is not so hard to understand,
since it only contains 3 actors and 7 messages exchanged, if we add 2 more actors
for instance, the number of exchanged messages grows up to 37. Regardless of the
diﬀerent initial conﬁgurations, the counter-example returned by the architecture is
the same in both cases. Then, comparing with counter-examples in MSC (Mes-
sage Sequence Chart), the counter-example in the level of LEP can be seen as a
simpliﬁcation that contains just those elements that directly regard the property
analysed.
In order to provide information for translating the chosen model checker’s
counter-example into a new one at the abstract level of LEP, we insert into the in-
termediate code a control variable called codePositionLEP that works as a marker.
This variable is updated at key points of a LEP speciﬁcation: at the beginning of
each module; at the beginning of a set of transitions; and at the beginning of a tran-
sition’s action, i.e. after a satisﬁed pre-condition. Then, when a counter-example is
returned at Promela’s level, we can check the value of the variable and detect which
part of the LEP speciﬁcation is probably causing the error.
The counter-example returned by the architecture is produced through de fol-
lowing steps: (1) Generate the negation φ¯Promela of the property φPromela to be
veriﬁed; (2) Search in the counter-example for the state where φ¯Promela is satisﬁed.
At this point we have the simulated command and the marker (related to LEP);
(3) Given the marker and the command at Promela, we look in the original speciﬁ-
cation for the related LEP command; (4) If the execution of the related command
depends upon a pre-condition in LEP, the agent of the pre-condition must also oc-
curs in the counter-example; (5) We repeat the process until we do not ﬁnd any
new pre-condition. Then, the counter-example is the sequence built.
4 Related Work
IF toolbox [3] is a validation platform for timed asynchronous systems. It is built
upon an intermediate representation language based on extended timed automata.
The toolbox contains dedicated tools on the intermediate language, like compilers,
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static analysers and model-checkers, as well as front-ends to various speciﬁcation
languages and validation tools. Aside the timed features, our approach diﬀers from
the IF toolbox in the input language, since we just accepts LEP speciﬁcations for
now and IF has various front-ends, the focus of the architecture and the attribute
network grammar that adds the capability of validating the speciﬁcation with many
diﬀerent topologies.
SAL [2] is a framework that combines diﬀerent tools for abstraction, program
analysis, theorem proving, and model checking toward calculating properties of
concurrent systems. The core of SAL is its intermediate language for specifying
concurrent systems in a compositional way. SAL speciﬁcation language is closer
to a general-purpose model checker’s input language. Comparing the input lan-
guages, abstraction caused by the use of pronouns in LEP is the main diﬀerence. It
also suggests an implementation that replaces our intermediate language by SAL’s
intermediate language.
In [5] is presented an extension of the framework ASM-WB (Abstract State
Machines Workbench) for SMV and MDG. ASM-SL is the speciﬁcation language
and ASM-IL the intermediate one that enables the use of diﬀerent veriﬁcation tools.
This work is similar to our approach. In both cases there is an input language
where models are speciﬁed. ASM-SL is based on domains and functions and is
more suitable to transition systems, while in LEP process calculus take place. As
an advantage, LEP provides pronouns for simplifying the speciﬁcation. The authors
argue that the model checker’s result can be parsed in order to generate a higher-
level result. However, it is still not implemented.
In [13], the author uses an abstract language called TAP and its computa-
tion model in order to talk about assumptions taken in the veriﬁcation of network
protocols. The execution model can be used in translating an abstract protocol
speciﬁcation from this language into C program as a way of turning the speciﬁ-
cation executable. In our case the generated model checker’s models provide the
executability of our architecture. In spite of being an abstract language, elements
in the network are referred explicitly through their identiﬁers. In many scenarios
in this work we could see how valuable would be the use of pronouns. The idea of
translating between speciﬁcations is similar to ours. However, we do it in two steps
in order to ease the use of diﬀerent veriﬁcation tools.
5 Conclusion
From this work we can conclude that domain speciﬁc languages can improve greatly
the task of mobile protocol speciﬁcation when comparing with languages designed to
general-purpose. In addition, LEP’s pronouns can really simplify the speciﬁcation
of intricating mobile protocols behaviours as broadcast, multicast or agreement
algorithms. Implementation concerns as the replication of messages that arises
when ﬂooding in the translation of the pronoun everyone are treated implicitly
through the translations to the intermediate representation.
About pronouns, everyone interpretation is a little bit tricky since one can imag-
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ine that it regards to the whole set of nodes that are reachable from a speciﬁc node.
However, as this set changes accordingly to the dynamic behaviour of the network,
probably a node would wait indeﬁnitely for everyone’s response. Furthermore, when
using this pronoun in the model’s properties for veriﬁcation, it regards a state of the
system where every process has received a speciﬁc message rather than a state of a
process, which received messages from every process in the system. Another point
is that some pronouns are not suitable to every situation. For example, it does not
make sense to use a sender pronoun in a receive command, since its value is only
assigned in the action associated to a receive command. Despite these details, the
advantage of using pronouns seems to be clear.
From the related work, we see that the integration of the proposed architecture
with projects that aim the translation among diﬀerent model checker’s input lan-
guage like SAL [2] is a promising step. We would join the power of translation of
those projects with the expressiveness of LEP.
Considering the manual speciﬁcations of the mobile protocols in Spin, the whole
speciﬁcation of DSR is about ﬁve times greater than the speciﬁcation in LEP. The
speciﬁcation in SMV is even bigger due to limitations in its input language. It
aﬀects readability, maintainability and mainly trustfulness in the speciﬁcation and
in the counter-examples obtained. Nevertheless, since our architecture still do not
optimize the generated code, our approach does not attack the state explosion
problem.
Another extension will be to allow the input of the speciﬁcations in the MSC
(Message Sequence Chart) format. It is quite desirable since the majority of protocol
designers are used to this format. Probably we will face some diﬃculties like to turn
the speciﬁcation of these charts more precise. In addition, we will have to propose
a graphical representation for the LEP pronouns.
About DSR and other protocols analysed, due to smart state exploration of
most model checking techniques, it was possible to verify properties without having
to instantiate so many objects as found in real life. The speciﬁcation raised the
question about how we can ﬁnd a minimal model (regarding the number of instances)
that is enough to represent the system in the context of the properties to be veriﬁed.
It would become useless the number of instances given in the topology declaration
of the speciﬁcation in LEP. This is beyond the scope of this paper and will be part
of our future work.
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